Attackers inject malicious code into Ledger and 177 other websites to redirect cryptocurrency payments
Hackers compromised websites of major companies including Ledger by injecting malicious code that redirects cryptocurrency payments without breaching wallets or stealing private keys. The attack demonstrates a novel vulnerability in web-based crypto transactions where users can unknowingly authorize transfers to attacker-controlled addresses.
- Malicious scripts infected 188 website scripts across 178 organizations including Ledger, BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce and HSBC via Optimizely platform.
- Attackers substituted legitimate cryptocurrency addresses with their own in visible text, input fields, links and clipboard operations across five blockchains.
- Report URI documented approximately $7,040 in cryptocurrency received by attacker addresses as of November 16, with Bitcoin comprising roughly $5,380 of the total.
- 188 Website scripts across affected organizations exposed to malicious code injections.
- $7,040 Cryptocurrency received by attacker-linked addresses as of November 16 UTC.
- $5,380 Bitcoin portion of stolen funds, with Litecoin, Tron, Ethereum and BNB also targeted.
- 169 to 1 Infected scripts in Report URI’s sample, cleaned within one hour on November 16.
Researchers at cybersecurity firm Report URI discovered Monday that attackers had inserted malicious code into customer-specific JavaScript configurations delivered through Optimizely, a platform that major websites use for testing and personalizing user experiences. The compromised code reached visitors through a service those organizations already trusted, exposing a critical vulnerability in how cryptocurrency payments flow through web interfaces. Ledger’s website was among the affected properties, though the company’s hardware wallets, firmware and signing infrastructure were not breached. The story was first reported by CryptoSlate.
Address swapping as an alternative to wallet theft
The attack mechanism bypassed traditional wallet security by targeting the display layer rather than the wallet itself. Malware identified cryptocurrency addresses shown on infected websites and replaced them with destinations controlled by attackers. Hudson Rock, another cybersecurity firm, recovered eight poisoned Optimizely project files and found code designed to alter wallet addresses in visible text, input fields, links, and clipboard operations across Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Tron and Litecoin.
A user copying what appeared to be a legitimate payment address from an infected webpage could unknowingly paste an attacker-controlled address into their wallet application. If the user then approved the transaction without verifying the destination address, funds would flow to the attacker. The technique circumvents an important security layer because the wallet functions exactly as intended while authorizing a payment to the wrong recipient.
Hudson Rock found no evidence that recovered malware directly extracted wallet seed phrases or initiated unauthorized blockchain transactions through wallet-signing functions.
Embedded fallback code complicates remediation efforts
The attackers embedded malicious payloads directly into two recovered Optimizely files, creating a secondary execution path that persisted even if remote servers were blocked. Report URI observed a large-scale cleanup that reduced infected scripts in its sample from 169 at 20:56 UTC to just one at 21:52 UTC on November 16 (Monday), with Ledger’s affected script reportedly cleaned at approximately 20:41 UTC. However, the embedded copies of malicious code meant that blocking attackers’ remote servers alone could leave address substitution functional, subject to browser policy constraints.
Beyond cryptocurrency theft, researchers identified additional malware capabilities including interception of payment card information, collection of browser-accessible cookies and capture of screenshots. Code associated with the Coruna and DarkSword iPhone exploit kits was also identified, potentially exposing visitors using vulnerable Apple devices to additional attacks.
The attackers’ access method remains unknown
How attackers obtained write permissions to modify scripts for so many unrelated organizations remains unresolved. Report URI has not established whether the intrusion originated from compromised credentials, an Optimizely system vulnerability, or another access route.
At publication, the investigation had not established the number of affected visitors or the full extent of financial losses.
The BlockWest read. The attack reveals a structural vulnerability in how web platforms deliver trusted code to users: Optimizely’s legitimate scripts became a distribution vector precisely because websites trusted them. Blocking malicious hosts after the fact leaves embedded payloads intact. The question for infrastructure providers is whether supply-chain dependencies themselves require rethinking, not just better endpoint detection.
Researchers have not disclosed whether they notified law enforcement or whether Optimizely has committed to auditing all customer-specific JavaScript configurations for malicious modifications. The status of ongoing victim identification and the full scope of financial losses remain pending as investigators work to determine whether additional theft campaigns leveraged the same access vector.
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